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Mass evacuations, particularly those at a statewide level, represent the largest single-

event traffic movements that exist. These complex events can last several days, cover thousands
of miles of roadway, and include hundreds of thousands of people and vehicles. Often, they are
also marked by enormous delay and congestion and are nearly always criticized for their
inefficiency and lack of management. However, there are no standardized methods by which to
systematically quantify traffic characteristics at the proper scale. This paper describes research
to develop and apply an analytical method to measure and describe statewide mass-evacuations
in a practical, cost-effective manner. The research methods are based on simple, yet widely
available, and easily understood traffic count datasets that support both qualitative and
quantitative analyses. By spatially and temporally arranging sensor-based statewide traffic
volume data from Hurricane Irma (2017), Michael (2018), Tubbs Fire (2017), and Thomas Fire
(2018) evacuations, these methods were able to describe and address several key questions about
these events. The methods described herein estimate the start and end of the auto-based
evacuation, the loading and peaking characteristics of traffic, and the total number of vehicles
used in the evacuation process, as well as the effective start and end of the auto-based reentry.
Among the key findings of this work were that the Hurricane Irma and Michael evacuations
began several days before landfall, peaking two to three days prior to the storm, suggesting a
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heightened perception of risk; and that the Thomas and Tubbs fire evacuations traffic were
impacted by subsequent fires nearby. It is expected that state departments of transportation and
emergency management officials would be able to reproduce the procedure presented here to
analyze future evacuations.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Mass evacuations, particularly those at a statewide level, represent single-event traffic
movements that can occur. These complex transportation events can last several days, span
thousands of miles of roadway, and include hundreds of thousands of people and vehicles
traveling with vital urgency. Often, they are also plagued by enormous travel delay and
congestion and are nearly always criticized for their inefficiency and lack of management.
However, there are few studies quantitatively examine such events to objectively asses what
travel conditions were actually like. Typically, opinions are based on media reports that tend to
sensationalize poor operations and focus strictly on areas that are performing poorly.
Unfortunately, there are many reasons why mass evacuations tend to be comprehensively
studied. Obviously, they are large and complex, but another is that there are no standardized
methods by which to systematically quantify traffic characteristics at the proper scale. There are
few indicators, apart from a lack of fatalities and the amount of vehicles moved, to determine if
any evacuation was “effective” or not. Instead, outside of media reports, emergency managers
and transportation professionals often work under general assumptions that an evacuation was
effective if people were able to get out of danger and no one drowned in their homes.
Purpose Statement
To provide a basis of measurement and comparison, the study describes research
undertaken to examine and assess evacuation characteristics. More importantly, the study
illustrates methods to measure and quantify evacuations in an unbiased, practical, and repeatable
fashion that is both intuitive and beneficial to state officials. The research methods are based on
simple, yet widely available, and easily understood traffic count datasets. Traffic volume counts

2
serve as a fundamental parameter of traffic measurement, but they can yield enormous insights
into the ebb and flow of daily commutes and when, where, how much, and how fast people are
able to move during an evacuation. These wide area, long term vehicle count can also be used to
illustrate the movement of evacuees after the hurricane to better understand how many vehicles
were impacted, when the recovery began, and even how long it took based on when the traffic
patterns returned to normal.
Objectives
Based on these ideas, the objectives of the research are to spatially and temporally
quantify key aspects of the evacuation and reentry process in Florida and California during the
record-setting 2017 and 2018 hurricane and wildfire seasons, specifically:
(i) When did the auto-based evacuation make a measurable impact on traffic (when
did it noticeably start)?
(ii) What were the loading characteristics of the evacuating traffic on the network?
(iii) What was the peak evacuation volume and when did it occur?
(iv) When did the auto-based evacuation conclude?
(v) How many vehicles were used in the evacuation?
(vi) When did the reentry begin?
(vii) When did reentry effectively conclude?
These objectives are achieved through the observation and analysis of roadway volumes
collected from ground-based sensors (predominately, magnetic-loop detectors) during
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hurricanes and wildfires of 2017-2018 evacuations and reentries in the State of Florida and
California. These two events provide a unique opportunity to study the evacuation phenomenon
because they are among the largest in the history of the united States; they affected nearly all of
the major metropolitan population centers of the state; and traffic volumes are recorded on
geographic scale and at levels of fidelity rarely achieved in prior evacuation studies.
Research Contribution
The scientific contribution of this work is that it demonstrates a straightforward and
reproducible methodology to measure the auto-based evacuation response and reentry of an area.
The proposed methods demonstrated in this paper have a significant practical value for state
transportation and/or emergency management agencies seeking to quickly and accurately assess
evacuation characteristics. This research also expands the literature by providing insights into
the less-often-studied topic of evacuation reentry timing and participation. Finally, it creates a
set of aggregate evacuation parameters that can be used to calibrate evacuation planning and
simulation models making the paper a valued reference for future research studies.
Delimitations and Assumptions
This study required to filter and set boundaries for the acquired data, since in many of
these natural disasters there is always a margin of error because of the sensors in the region being
affected. The acquired full real time data that contained region location, naming, and volume
information, such as county names, latitudes, longitudes, speed, volume, among others. This data
was filtered among those sensor-based regions that were unavailable because of the disaster. For
example, during Michael there were many sensors on the west coast of the State of Florida that
were not recording data, assuming that these sensors were either malfunctioning because of the
weather, connection breakage, or damaged.
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Limitations
Analysts tend to focus on how the evacuation progressed over time giving importance to
the topography and infrastructure of the region. The primary limitations that analysts or
researchers cannot modify, or change is the current transportation network. The network was
considered and designed for the highest demand, which is most likely not a massive evacuation.
This study considered the current network, how state’s current and past plans, and most
importantly how the current evacuations took place.
Background
Natural disasters have always been an issue for many countries, according to the Natural
Hazard Project of the Department of Regional Development and Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance/U.S. Agency for International Development, natural disasters are “naturally
occurring physical phenomena caused by rapid or slow onset events which can be geophysical,
hydrological, climatological, meteorological, or biological” (International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, n.d.). Hurricanes are natural disasters that affect the dayto-day climate through strong winds and heavy storms, hurricanes are base under a category
from 1 to 5. These hurricanes form when there is warm ocean water, the weather is moist and
humid. While the humid air flows up where there is low pressure over the warm ocean water,
then the water is released from the air as it starts to rotate creating the clouds of the storm shown
in Figure 5. Wildfires on the other hand, are phenomenon that are unpredictable when it comes
to location, time, and direction; this is because wildfires depend on the speed of the winds and
heat temperature. Figure 6 shows the prone areas for wildfires to occur in the State of California.

5

Figure 1. How are hurricanes or tropical cyclones formed. Source: The
National Hurricane Center. Retrieved on January 20th, 2018.

Florida and California have their season of danger and precautions, which leads to
evacuations. In 2017, California suffered from four wildfires that spread through Southern
California leaving more than 30 structures destroyed through its path (Alvarez & Santora, 2017).
This also includes about 200,000 people had little time to prepare during the 2017 Ventura,
California wildfire. In 2017, Florida suffered from a category 4 hurricane with maximum wind
speed of 130 miles per hour destroying about 25% of homes in the Florida Keys, flooding all of
the coasts in Florida and leaving more than three million Floridians without power (Wall Street
Journal, 2017). Those two states have a lot in common; their evacuations consist on large
capacity movements because both are heavy populated states. Even though Florida’s 2017hurricane evacuation was considered the biggest evacuation in the United States history,
California’s wildfire destruction and deaths have been marked in history.
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Fundamentally, surface transportation seeks to find a balance between supply and
demand. An increase in the number of vehicles on a road (demand) subsequently leads to an
increase in congestion and travel time (price), assuming the supply of roads does not change.
This concept is universal in traffic analysis. In general, the supply of roads is typically governed
by daily commuting traffic. That is to say, the number of roads servicing an area is usually a
function of the number of daily commuters needing access to this area. In theory, as the number
of commuters grow over time, so too should the number/capacity of roads. The delicate balance
between travel supply and demand leaves communities vulnerable to sudden and drastic
increases in demand. A spike in demand can lead to excessive congestion with the potential to
cause network wide gridlock. Such situations occur during road maintenance or special events
but are most consequential during emergency evacuations. Because roads are design for daily
commuter traffic, the increase in demand caused by the evacuating public and the potential for
subsequence gridlock, is a serious problem for transportation officials.
The 2017 evacuation of Hurricane Irma has been referred to as the largest evacuation in
the history of the nation with approximately 6.5 million Floridians under mandatory or voluntary
evacuation orders (Marshall, 2017). Hurricane Irma impacted nearly the entire peninsula and
its high-powered winds, storm surge, and uniquely unpredictable path caused havoc on the
Florida roadways. Ultimately, Hurricane Irma made two landfalls within the state of Florida.
The first was near Cudjoe Key in the lower Florida Keys, on September 10th, 2017 at
approximately 9:10 AM ET as a Category 4 hurricane with sustained winds of 130 mph (209
kph) as shown in Figure 1. The second landfall was at approximately 3:35 PM ET near Marco
Island, just south of Naples, FL as a Category 3 hurricane with winds of 115 mph (161 kph)
(Jansen, 2017). The storm left approximately 6.7 million homes (65 percent of the state),
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without power (O'Connor, 2017). Hurricane Irma was attributed to taking the lives of 75
Floridians and costing an estimated $49 billion (Wile, 2017). The lower Florida Keys remained
closed to non-residents for approximately three weeks following the storm (Associated Press,
2017).

Figure 2. This figure illustrates the projected track of Hurricane Irma. Picture created by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. Retrieved on
December 5th, 2017.

Hurricane Michael was category 5 hurricane that made landfall near Mexico Beach,
Florida on October 10th, 2018 at approximately 12:30 P.M. With sustained wind speeds of 155
mph (250 kpm), Hurricane Michael was the strongest storm by wind speed to strike the mainland
U.S. since hurricane Andrew in 1992 (Beven, Berg, & Hagen, 2019). Hurricane Michael was
directly responsible for 16 deaths and approximately $25 billion in damage. In total, 21 counties

8
issued evacuation orders, of which 12 held mandatory orders in place (Haddad, 2018). However,
initial reports suggested Hurricane Michael would make landfall as category 3 hurricane, which
may have had an impact on evacuation participation rates leading up to landfall as shown in
Figure 3 (Roberson, 2018). Hurricane Michael’s intensity projections 54 hours before landfall

forecast a Category 1 or Category 2 storm (United States, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), Nation Hurricane Center, 2018).

Figure 3. This figure illustrates the projected track of Hurricane Micheal. Source: National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Department of Commerce. Retrieved on January
21st, 2019.
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Wildfires are generally formed by a high and low pressure usually occurs in mountainous
areas as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Normally anyone can start a fire with three simple
things: fuel, oxygen, and heat. Wildfires tend to occur naturally with dry and weather and
droughts, where green vegetation turns into bone-dry (flammable fuel), with warm temperatures
(combustion), the strong winds that spreads the fire, and the last ingredient is a spark that can be
caused by lighting, downed power line, cigarette, among others (Wolters, 2019). The National
Geographic states that an “average of 72 thousand wildfires cleared an average of 7 million acres
of the United States” each year since 2000 (Wolters, 2019). This is said to be double the number
of acres burnt by wildfires in the previous decade. As population increase causing the additions
of homes to the rural and wilderness areas, and the with the climatology changes change making
the U.S. hotter and drier every year, the more wildfires will occur. According to the
Environmental Protection Agency, wildfires are classified as natural disasters, but about 15
percent of these occur on their own instead of human causes (Wolters, 2019)
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Figure 4. The severity of fire hazard zones across the State of California. Source: Copyright:
Maps of the World
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.

Figure 5. This figure illustrates how wildfires are formed in California.
Source: National Weather Service; Storm Prediction Center and USA
Today. Retrieved on June 13th, 2019.

One of the most destructive wildfires California had in 2017 was Tubbs Fire. 2017 Tubbs
Fire has been under investigation since 2017, this fire started October 8th, 2017 around 9:45 p.m.
and the fire was fully contained on October 31st, 2018. Tubbs Fire destroyed and damaged about
six thousand structures and caused about 22 deaths as shown in Figure 3 (Cal Fire, 2018). This
wildfire is categorized as the first most destructive fire in California, until 2018 Thomas Fire
occurrence. The Tubbs fire started about a quarter mile north of Santa Rosa and began spreading
south west of Santa Rosa as shown in Figure 3, eventually reaching Santa Rosa by 3:00 a.m. on
October 9th. More information and timeline on the spread of the Tubbs Fire in the Appendix.
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Key:
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Figure 6. This figure illustrates the destruction and spreading of the
Tubbs fire in the Napa and Sonoma County. Source: The Bureau of
Land Management, Esri, HERE, Garmin, USGS, NGA, EPA, USDA,
NPS and Cal Fire. Retrieved on June 13th, 2019.

The largest wildfire in California’s history and in 2018 was the Thomas Fire that started
on November 4th, 2018 and the fire was fully contained on December 15th, 2018. Thomas Fire
caused about 15 deaths and about two thousand structures were damaged becoming the largest
wildfire in California’s history (Cal Fire, 2018). Cal Fire estimated that about 177 million
dollars were spent to fight the Thomas Fire from spreading and containment (Helsel, 2017).
According to Sommer, the growth of population has been spreading to more fire-prone areas in
the State of California (Sommer, 2017). As shown in the figure 4, the fire began on north of
Santa Paula, then started spreading quickly to Ventura, and finally start threatening Ojai Valley
on December 13th, 2018.
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Figure 7. This figure illustrates the progression of the Thomas Fire in 2018. Source: Ventura County,
Mapzen, OpenStreetMap. Map perimeter updated as of 4 a.m. on Dec. 11. Retrieved on June 10th,
2019.
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Chapter II
Review of the Relevant Literature
The design, implementation, planning, and research of evacuations in Florida and
California are very significant to the residences of this state and the future of keeping our
population safe from any global climatological events that may occur. The overall topic of using
the sensor-based data and developing a quantifying system from a temporal and spatial analysis
is to be analyze how the evacuation plan was effective, how evacuees move over time and
quantifying the amount of time that was take to evacuate after or before evacuation orders as
well as for the reentry. Given the issue observing how effective were the orders, evacuations,
and reentry plans in order to evacuate a big population in a short amount of time.
Understanding the impact of Hurricane Irma, Michael, and Wildfires on the evacuation
process within Florida and California can provide insights for future storms and evacuation
events. The fundamentals for the analysis, the supply and demand of vehicles and roads is
universal within the transportation sciences. Therefore, the results and insights gained here can
benefit future traffic, urban, and disaster management planners. The State of Florida has not seen
any major destruction as seen during Hurricane Irma in 2017 and Michael in 2018, since
Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Similarly, California has not had a major wildfire disaster with
numerous fatalities since the Cedar Fire (San Diego County) in 2003. This analysis will help
FDOT and LADOT be better prepared for a massive evacuation when time is needed. Also
educate residents how traffic works, especially how the preparations for selecting evacuation
routes. For the development of this research, several areas of prior literature in specific regions,
special events and emergency planning, sensor-based and empirical studies on manual traffic
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control were read and implemented in this study. The following sections of this chapter will
discuss these elements in further detail.
Traffic Analysis and Modeling Literature
The spatial and temporal patterns tend to help explore the traffic volume patterns of some
secondary and low volume roadways that occurred in Florida during Hurricane Irma. This study
matches the study done in Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina, which the researchers collected
hourly traffic volume at each station for all of August 2005 (Wolshon & McArdle, 2011).
According to Wolshon and McArdle, “statistical testing was also used to quantitatively discern
the volume patterns associated with the evacuation and reentry” of the volume collected.
Statistical testing was valuable when there was low traffic routine volume or considerably
volume variation (Wolshon & McArdle, 2011). Through the Flow Rate versus Days statistical
graph analysis are used to determine the different peaks that suggest different traffic situations.
Westbound traffic volume lanes of Louisiana State Highway 28 (LA 28) shows that the “traffic
counts on secondary roads had volume peaks starting and ending later could suggest a travel
time lag as evacuees moved north” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2011). The study observes the traffic
patterns that includes the origin and destination while using the location and direction of the
evacuees. In addition, this observation done by Wolshon and McArdle studied the volumes
around the cities and major roads, such as the ones done in this analysis.
Many studies identify evacuation volumes to compare the volumes from the previous
week of the evacuation, such as Li, Ozbay, Bartin, Iyer, and Canegie’s research from 2013. This
paper’s methodology consisted in using automatic traffic count data from the toll booths during
Hurricane Irene to develop empirical response curves for a single county in New Jersey (Li,
Ozbay, Bartin, Iyer, & Carnegie, Empirical Evacuation Response Curve During Hurricane Irene
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in cape May County, New Jersey, 2013). This is similar to our graphical analysis for the counties
in Florida and California, volumes were used and directions from the sensor-based data. Also,
the studies identifies the evacuation traffic starting about six hours before the mandatory
evacuation order for the barrier islands, which our analysis considers a good variable to quantify
the amount of evacuees in both the evacuation and reentry. In addition, the overall quick response
to a mandatory evacuation order was detected during the observed time, which they assumed
that it could be due to the large tourist population in the area (Li, Ozbay, Bartin, Iyer, & Carnegie,
Empirical Evacuation Response Curve During Hurricane Irene in cape May County, New Jersey,
2013). Li and Ozbay furthered their research in their spatial exposure and data that contained
weigh-in-motion stations and historical travel time data (Li & Ozbay, Hurricane Irene
Evacuation Traffic Patterns in New Jersey, 2014). As a result of this data, the analyst observed
that the overall evacuation took approximately 36 hours where the evacuation traffic was mostly
shown near the shore, inclining that the evacuees moved west instead of north along the shore
(Li & Ozbay, Hurricane Irene Evacuation Traffic Patterns in New Jersey, 2014). In comparison
to Hurricane Sandy, the volumes were lower than Hurricane Irene’s, but with similar spatial
patterns (Li, Ozbay, & Bartin, Effects of Hurricanes Irene and Sandy in New Jersey: Traffic
Patterns and Highway Disruptions During Evacuations, 2015).
Li et al. developed a system for communities threatened by hurricanes that computed the
Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) (Lindell & Prater, Critical Behavioral Assumptions in
Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis for Private Vehicles: Examples from Hurricane Research
and Planning, 2007). This computation requires analysts to create sophisticated models of
evacuation flows (Lindell & Prater, Critical Behavioral Assumptions in Evacuation Time
Estimate Analysis for Private Vehicles: Examples from Hurricane Research and Planning, 2007).

17
This study presents the “principal behavioral variables affecting hurricane ETEs, which provides
recommendations and describes the available empirical data relevant to the ETE models” for
future research and more effective analytical methods (Lindell & Prater, Critical Behavioral
Assumptions in Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis for Private Vehicles: Examples from
Hurricane Research and Planning, 2007).
The prior studies related to the amount of time residents were away from the evacuation
zones have yet not been studied, except for the study done by Lindell, Kang, and Prater in their
Natural Hazard publication. Their study concluded that Hurricane Lili (Category 4), the second
costliest and strongest hurricane in 2002, where the average duration of time away from home
was approximately two and half days (Lindell, Kang, & Prater, the Logistics of Household
Hurricane Evacuation, 2011), whereas Hurricane Katrina (Category 5) in 2005, the average was
about two weeks (Wu, Lindell, & Prater, 2012). This proposes that the amount of time residents
are away can vary in many different situations and states, which could be consider by the amount
of damage, emergency response ability, and utilities to the households.
Meteorologists have found a pattern by analyzing all hurricanes that have gone or gotten
close to Florida and most of them have taken the path of the coasts (East and West) or center of
the state coming from the south and affecting the entire state. According to Brian Wolshon
(P.h.D., P.E.) and Ben McArdle, “this trend is expected to continue as a global climatological
patterns are forecast to result in a long-term period of highly active and threatening tropical
weather within the Atlantic Basin”, this was written for Hurricane Katrina regional evacuation
and with this in mind the FDOT and the state government need an ultimate evacuation plan for
the most massive and threatening hurricane possible (Wolshon & McArdle, 2011). With this
previous research, this study is able to investigate the patterns taken from the biggest hurricane
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evacuation that the state of Florida has ever had and pass along the information to make specific
arrangements and improvements.
There are categorizations of different traffic conditions such as contraflow, maximum
and minimum flow volumes. For Hurricane Katrina the statistical data analysis on the Wolshon’s
paper, states that “maximum sustainable flow under evacuation conditions are important because
they are often used” (Wolshon B. , Empirical Characterization of Mass Evacuation Traffic Flow,
2008). This study consists of using detector data to investigate different aspects of an evacuation
for future planning, as seen in many other studies. In addition, the “forecast that the times were
required to clear locations on the basis of combinations of population size, the response rate, and
the available roadway capacity” are important to the categorization of different traffic conditions
(Wolshon B. , Empirical Characterization of Mass Evacuation Traffic Flow, 2008). Wolshon
used this data collected during Hurricane Katrina to evaluate how well the Highway Capacity
Manual (HCM) maximum capacities matched the detector reported flows for the different
roadway networks in Louisiana. The different types of roadway networks consist in contraflow
freeway segments, freeways operating in the normal direction, four-lane arterial roadways, and
two-lane arterials. The conclusion to this study was that the maximum flows on these types of
roadways were lower than the theoretical values of the HCM (Wolshon B. , Empirical
Characterization of Mass Evacuation Traffic Flow, 2008).
Evacuations are needed in a state of emergency; hurricanes that form close to Florida are
most likely to develop into extremely strong hurricanes with wind speed of more than 90 mph.
In the case of an evacuation, the state government declares publicly a state of emergency when
hurricanes are a category 4 or more. According to Boyd, Wolshon, and Heerden, understanding
the relationship between emergency communication and response is important for “disaster
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planning and response” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2009). In Florida Governor Rick Scott
communicated that Florida was in a state of emergency after predictions were given that
hurricane Irma was going to make its course through the entire peninsula, from the Keys to
Tallahassee. Similarly, to the impact that the states’ warning announcements made on the spatial
and temporal movement of the evacuation traffic in Louisiana, Florida’s warnings of different
evacuation zones impacted the spatial and temporal movement of the evacuation traffic
(Wolshon, Boyd, & Heerden, 2009). The impact that Florida had through these announcements
were bigger than Louisiana’s because Florida has only one way to evacuate when the
announcements stated that the populations needed to be away from the coasts. Since Florida is a
peninsula, the only way to evacuate for such a massive dangerous hurricane is north, were how
the population evacuated from East to West and South to North by the predictions of the
meteorologists, states announcements, and the media can be analyzed. Many people stayed in
their homes rather than evacuate and “the role of effective risk communications, both long term
and immediately prior to landfall, cannot be emphasized” when there is a higher risk of losing
people during such a major evacuation in Florida, California, and North Carolina.
Communication is extremely important during emergency evacuations that “[n]ot only can
accurate information mean the difference between life and death, [but] it can provide reassurance
[and guidance] that response and recovery are truly underway” (Federal Emergency
Management Agency). The type of governor evacuation order is “emerged as a statistically
significant predictor of evacuation behavior and expectation notice” as said in previously in this
paper (Thompson, Garfin, & Silver, 2016).
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Through global climatological patterns, studies have found that there will be a “longterm period of highly active and threatening tropical weather” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2009).
According to this paper, about 36-38 hours are needed to evacuate the population in New Orleans
through the traffic volumes analysis, which is also what the Corps of Engineers (CoE) estimated
to be 72 hours. Just as the traffic volume data was used in the New Orleans Hurricane analysis,
on the Irma analysis helps illustrate the effects of the Irma evacuation plan on the “roadway
infrastructure in both spatial and temporal terms” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2009). The temporal
analyses evaluate the “movement of traffic over time to assess the apparent starting and ending
times of the evacuation, estimated travel time, the impact of contraflow operations, and the
relationship of these parameters to [the] routine conditions” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2009).
Temporal pattern has an evacuation timeline and temporal traffic movements across the state of
Florida, this will keep track of the storm compared to the traffic volumes shown in the dataset
that was acquired. Similarly, the time that residents take to get from the threat zone to the safe
zone shows when the evacuation needs to begin and end; it also predicts if the evacuation was
effective or not. As it states the “primary goal of many transportation agencies is to measure and
minimize travel time in evacuations” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2009). Our investigation and data
acquire the idea of an “Evacuation flow”, where the evacuation volume flow volume “increased
above and returned to (or went below)” the normal historical average. On the other hand, the
spatial analyses evaluates the “impact of the extent of traffic dispersion” and “its terms of
roadway functional classification and in contrast to the evacuation” to the prior year (Wolshon
& McArdle, 2009).
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Analyzing graphs for spatial-temporal patterns can suggest many traffic situations as
well, it is helpful to show conditions at particular points and times along the routes (Wolshon &
Dixit, Traffic Modeling and Simulation for Regional Multimodal Evacuation Analysis, 2012).
The method of organizing the traffic volume versus day/time of the data set was done by the
analysis that Wolshon and Dixit put together in the Hurricane Katrina evacuation research
papers. According to Wolshon and Dixit, “[e]arly studies to apply to traffic simulation for
evacuation were limited in their geographical scales and time duration”, this will help the
research be more specific when helping FDOT (Wolshon & Dixit, Traffic Modeling and
Simulation for Regional Multimodal Evacuation Analysis, 2012).
After Hurricane Andrew there were many researchers that analyzed the “maximum
hourly rate on a uniform roadway section during a given time under prevailing” (Dixit &
Wolshon, 2014). According to Dixit and Wolshon, there are two measures that are introduced
“maximum evacuation flow rates (MEFR)” and “maximum sustainable evacuation flow rates
(MSEFR)” (Wolshon & Dixit, Traffic Modeling and Simulation for Regional Multimodal
Evacuation Analysis, 2012). MEFR is “found to peak to a maximum value for a brief period and
then drop[s] to flow rates that are able to be sustained for several hours as inflow is sufficient to
saturate the evacuation route” (peak max shown in the graphs of this analysis) and MSEFR is
“defined as sustainable flows that are observed for greater than or equal to one hour” (Dixit &
Wolshon, 2014). The reasons for these capacity drops are hypothesized by Brilon et al. (2005)
to be bottlenecks and different driver behavior. Bottlenecks are defined as “[t]he flow at the point
under investigation [that] remains fluent until the section between this point and the bottleneck
is filled with congested flow” subsequently “the maximum flow will be the bottleneck’s
capacity”. On the other hand, different driver behavior is defined as the “drivers [that are] in
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fluent traffic accept shorter headways since they expect to be able to pass the vehicles in front”,
“[o]nce they have given up this idea, they switch to a more safety-conscious style of driving and
keep longer headways” (Dixit & Wolshon, 2014).
Analyzing graphs for spatial-temporal patterns can suggest many traffic situations as
well, it is helpful to show conditions at particular points and times along the routes (Wolshon &
Dixit, Traffic Modeling and Simulation for Regional Multimodal Evacuation Analysis, 2012).
The method of organizing the traffic volume versus day/time of the data set was done by the
analysis that Wolshon and Dixit put together in the Hurricane Katrina evacuation research
papers. According to Wolshon and Dixit, “[e]arly studies to apply to traffic simulation for
evacuation were limited in their geographical scales and time duration”, this will help the
research be more specific when helping FDOT (Wolshon & Dixit, Traffic Modeling and
Simulation for Regional Multimodal Evacuation Analysis, 2012).
South Miami coastal evacuations for Hurricane Irma were done on Wednesday,
September 6th, 2017, prior to the landfall on Saturday the 9th and mandatory evacuation warnings
were communicated on Thursday the 7th. When evacuating from coast areas in Florida, there
are not many alternatives for routing the population, just like evacuating from the Keys, Miami
Beach, Palm Beach areas, and among others can only take certain evacuation routings. These
areas have a very particular geographic shape and roadway network for entering and exiting
these zones (Sadri, Ukkusuri, Ph.D., Murray-Tuite, Ph.D., & Gladwin, Ph.D., 2014). These
barrier islands on the coast are “relatively low-elevation islands [that] lie off much of the Atlantic
and Gulf Coastline and expose large numbers of their residents to storm surge risk from
hurricanes” (Sadri, Ukkusuri, Ph.D., Murray-Tuite, Ph.D., & Gladwin, Ph.D., 2014). Many of
our analysis that end up with high traffic volume are due to these areas on the coast of the state

23
of Florida, since evacuees tend to delay their departure from when the evacuation orders are
given, which causes “traffic surges [that] occur resulting in gridlock on several evacuation
routes” (Sadri, Ukkusuri, Ph.D., Murray-Tuite, Ph.D., & Gladwin, Ph.D., 2014). The meaning
of evacuation orders are to “allow clearance time for traffic to get past bottlenecks like bridges
and roads with limited traffic capacity” (Sadri, Ukkusuri, Ph.D., Murray-Tuite, Ph.D., &
Gladwin, Ph.D., 2014).
California’s wildfire impacts have left many deaths and damage across the State of
California. California has two unique winds that occur at the end of the year called the Diablo
Winds and the Santa Ana Winds, since vegetation is dried out from the summer season these
winds will pick up and wildfires will start appearing. Since California is a desert state, the dry
heat affects the winds and create these fires. According to Beloglazov, Almashor, Abebe,
Richter, and Barton Steer, the biggest factor in these traffic analysis models are “the departure
time of evacuees – the time when they leave their point of origin- which depends on their
awareness, beliefs and priorities”. The reason for these models to be analyzed are in general for
any type of evacuation, the resident’s behaviors have a heavy effect on the congestion of any
roadway system (Beloglazov, Almashor, Abebe, Richter, & Barton Steer, 2016). This is where
the spatial and temporal patterns take place, depending on those behaviors and decision making
after the influence of mass media, governors’ announcements, and department of transportation
evacuation routes.
Every state has their own mechanism and planning associated to their specific
topography, population, demand, and infrastructure. Li, Cova, and Dennison’s study is on a GIS
Model for traffic analysis. The purpose of this study is to “improve on previous methods by
coupling fire and traffic simulation models to set triggers”, which will allow analysts and
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planners to estimate the time needed to evacuate using a traffic simulation model (Li, Cova, &
Dennison, Setting Wildfire Evacuation Trigger Coupling Fire and Traffi Simulation Models: A
Spatiotemporal GIS Application, 2018). The literature presents that the “time required to
guarantee that 95% of the evacuating residents arrive at the safe area as a fire approaches a
community is estimated at 160 minutes for one scenario but 292 minutes if the travel demand is
doubled” (Li, Cova, & Dennison, Setting Wildfire Evacuation Trigger Coupling Fire and Traffi
Simulation Models: A Spatiotemporal GIS Application, 2018).
Conversely, the studies done in the California region are observing the critical zones of
danger through geographical information systems (GIS). According to Chou, two of the
“hypothetical spatial strategies of prescribed burning were evaluated in terms of their
effectiveness in reducing the danger to the district from fire and producing a more desirable
spatial pattern” in case of an evacuation (Chou, 2007). This study was analyzing the data of the
Idyllwild 7-5 minutes quadrangle in the Southern region of California where a probability model
was constructed (Chou, 2007). This probability model included vegetation, topography,
precipitation, temperature, proximity to buildings and transportation to generate the distribution
of fire to occur (Chou, 2007).
The creation of evacuation warning zones for wildfires characterized by data-driven
spatial modeling is important in the literature and methods behind the purpose. As stated in Li’s
dissertation, from the University of Utah, “[i]n wildfire evacuation practices, incident
commanders use prominent geographic features (e.g., rivers, roads, and ridgelines) as trigger
points, such that when a fire crosses a feature, the selected protective action recommendation
will be issued to the residents at risk” (Li D. , Modeling Wildfire Evacuation As Coupled HumanEnvironmental System Using Triggers, 2016). This study examines the “dynamics of evacuation
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timing by coupling wildfire spread modeling, trigger modeling, reverse geocoding, and traffic
simulation to model wildfire evacuation as a coupled human-environmental system” (Li D. ,
Modeling Wildfire Evacuation As Coupled Human-Environmental System Using Triggers,
2016). The research also explores the spatiotemporal dynamics behind evacuation timing by
coupling fire and traffic simulation models, where the integration of the two analysis sets triggers
to the wildfire evacuation based on the estimated evacuation times through simulation and
planning (Li D. , Modeling Wildfire Evacuation As Coupled Human-Environmental System
Using Triggers, 2016). In addition to the broad analysis, Li proposes a model for wildfire
evacuation that is a spatiotemporal GIS framework to couple fire and traffic simulation models
to set triggers during such event (Li D. , Modeling Wildfire Evacuation As Coupled HumanEnvironmental System Using Triggers, 2016). Similarly, to our analysis and transportation
knowledge, Li states that “with the increase of evacuation travel demand, more evacuees will be
exposed to fire risk” (Li D. , Modeling Wildfire Evacuation As Coupled Human-Environmental
System Using Triggers, 2016). This delays the evacuation causing the exposure to the fire rapidly
spreading.
Similarly, to many studies done for different countries a great example is the study
conducted by Zang, Lim, and Shaples, where they modeled spatial patterns of wildfire
occurrence in South-Eastern Australia. This study consists of identifying the exact locations of
future occurrences, many U.S. wildfire studies have been done for location of future, but no
traffic analysis for the movement of residents out of the risk area. Their research shows that
“wildfires are most likely to occur in mountainous areas, forests, savannahs, and lands with high
vegetation coverage, and are less likely to occur in grasslands and shrublands” (Zhang, Lim, &
Sharples, 2015). More studies similarly to Zang’s is the forest risk fire maps in a GIS open source
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application created by Teodoro and Duarte in Portugal (Teodoro & Duarte, 2012). Municipalities
in Portugal are required to produce a forest fire risk map annually by the Portuguese Forest
Authority (Teodoro & Duarte, 2012).
Micah Brachman, a student from the University of California - Santa Barbara, researched
the assumptions related to the empirical data from survey of people in Santa Barbara (Brachman,
2012). Similar to what Brachman mentions in her study that there are mathematical models
related to the hazard conditions of the regions, road topology, and population characteristics,
there is a need to challenge those mathematical methods and assumptions with real time data
(Brachman, 2012). Even though Brachman challenges through surveys, our research overlaps
with the idea of whether residents choose to “stay-or-go” when they are living in a mandatory
evacuation area. Brachman’s analysis uses survival analysis to “analyze empirical evacuation
route data and determine which wayfinding strategies were employed by Jesusita Fire evacuees”
(Brachman, 2012).
Many literatures focus on the development of a certain methodology to identify different
areas of planning and analysis in different evacuation situations. According to the study
presented in Church and Cova’s literature, their “Critical Cluster Model”, which can be used “to
identify small areas or neighborhoods which have high ratios of population to exit capacity”
(Chruch & Cova, 2000). This model can be used to produce maps of evacuation risks or
susceptibility in a GIS (Geographical Information Systems) system (Chruch & Cova, 2000).
The empirical knowledge and previous experience of different studies and analysis help
planning for evacuation easier, but in the case of population growth the real meaning and purpose
of effective and successful evacuation. Han, Yuan, and Urbanik II’s study presents different
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measures of effectiveness (MOE) for evacuation (Han, Yuan, & Urbanik II, 2007). The MOEs
presented where from different literatures previously done, which were “implicitly assumed or
explicitly defined” and an optimization of the MOEs is compiled and presented depending on
different situations (Han, Yuan, & Urbanik II, 2007).
On the other hand, population growth and residential areas expansion is a primary
concern when it comes to infrastructure and planning for an effective evacuation. Cova,
Theobald, Norman III, and Siebeneck’s study analyzed different communities and locations of
wildfire histories that have a pattern. According to this study, the pattern consists in sharing “a
unique vulnerability in that all residents may not be able to evacuate in scenarios with short
warning” (Cova, Theobald, Norman III, & Siebeneck, 2011). This study helps pinpoint the areas
of vulnerability with the wind patterns during certain time of the year in the west coast, especially
in California.
Another important observation in wildfire evacuations is the ability to consider the fire
management area of an evacuation. McCaffrey, Rhodes, and Stidham’s studied four different
communities in the United States “where some alternative to mass evacuation during a wildfire
was being considered” (McCaffrey, Rhodes, & Stidham, 2013). The results of this study is rather
interesting because while there are residents interested in increasing safety and reducing
uncertainty for emergency responders tend to think that the best approach is a mass evacuation
(McCaffrey, Rhodes, & Stidham, 2013). On the other hand, those who were interested in the
same, but for “homeowners tend to think that alternative responses were valid option”
(McCaffrey, Rhodes, & Stidham, 2013). This is one of the mayor differences that hurricane and
wildfire evacuations have, the use of emergency responders is a primary concern and priority to
these communities.
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California has limited studies on wildfires, the demand is related more towards the
environmental factors rather than the transportation impacts. On the other hand, Australia and
many foreign countries have studied other factors and impacts of a wildfire, such as engaging
and preparing the homeowners in these events. According to a group of researchers starting with
Stephens and Adams, California and many other states in the U.S. should learn from the studies
done in Australia (Stephens, et al., 2009). The researchers imply that “U.S. society has attempted
to accommodate many of the natural hazards inherent to the landscapes that we inhabit; by
examining the Australian model, we may approach a more sustainable coexistence with fire as
well” (Stephens, et al., 2009).
The graphical analysis of this research can be related to that of Wolshon, Archibald, and
McNeil’s. There are many factors that are included in such graphs that help reflect the day of the
week and the time of day variations. These variations during evacuations show a distorted
increase during an evacuation and re-entry, but a distorted decrease during the disasters.
According to Archibald and McNeil, “[g]raphing traffic against time provides insights into how
much variation occurs in these patterns and helps to identify disruptions”, such as congestion
assumptions. These assumptions are related to bottlenecks, construction downstream, closed exit
ramps, accidents, among others (Archibald & McNeil, 2012). In these graphical analyses the use
of conservation of flow to estimate vehicles evacuated are important because the “traffic counts
can be used to estimate the population evacuated” (Archibald & McNeil, 2012). As explained in
the previous sections, the use of traffic recorders or detectors count the number of vehicles that
pass-through a given location over a specific period of time. As stated in this literature, when
acquiring enough counters, the analysis of the traffic demand of the evacuation can be gathered
to “pinpoint exactly how many vehicles left a given area in the specified period” (Archibald &
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McNeil, 2012). This connects back to what our study’s procedure will be on, analyzing graphicly
the change in volume over time given the analyst the opportunity to evaluate the disruptions and
illustrate how effective are the evacuation announcements from the moment residents decide to
evacuate.
The equations from the Archibald and McNeil’s study is shown below to calculate the
change in vehicle count, number of evacuees, percentage occupancy of seasonal units,
number of people in each and the percentage calculated (Archibald & McNeil, 2012).
1.

How the change in vehicle count for an area can be calculated using the inbound and

outbound counts:
∆𝑛 = ∑ 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 (𝐼𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)
2.

Finding the number of evacuees using the number of vehicles that evacuated (∆𝑛),

assuming that the number of vehicles per household is the same for the residents and the visitors:
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑠 = |∆𝑛| 𝑥
3.

(𝑃𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑)
(𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑)

Identifying the percentage occupancy of seasonal units and the number of people in each:
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
+ %𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 (#𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠) 𝑥 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡

4.

Calculating the percentage evacuated using the number of evacuees and the total

population of the region:
%𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 =

(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑠)
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
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Due to population growth and urban development expansion during the past decade,
analysts consider evacuations to start to become more difficult. According to Pel, Bliemer, and
Hoogendoorn, “the frequency and intensity of natural disasters [have] been increasing over the
past decades”; their conclusion is based on two studies that were done by William H. Hooke in
2000 and Ross T. Newkirk 2001, (Pel, Bliemer, & Hoogendoorn, 2012). These studies focused
on many regions in the world and summarized in giving importance in investing on “efficient
disaster management strategies” for hazard prone regions, (Pel, Bliemer, & Hoogendoorn, 2012).
There are different factors to consider for a successful evacuation, such as “warning time,
response time, information and instructions dissemination procedure, evacuation routes, traffic
flow conditions, dynamic traffic control measures, etc.” (Pel, Bliemer, & Hoogendoorn, 2012).
This is the guidance towards the tempo-spatial analysis considering government announcements
for mandatory and voluntary evacuations. In addition, Pel, Bliemer, and Hoogendoorn suggested
that “the speed, intensity, and track of a hurricane or wildfire inappropriately [has] not effect on
travel demand” of the region during evacuations (Pel, Bliemer, & Hoogendoorn, 2012). There
are many models like the model shown in this study that gives a conceptual framework of a
repeated binary logit model to calculate the amount of people that evacuated and stayed.
A review of the literature has shown that currently there is no way to effectively compare
evacuations and re-entries, as well as traffic coverages through the area(s) that were evacuated.
Managing reentry can be challenging. In contrast to evacuation where destinations are dispersed,
in reentry, traffic converges to the area(s) that were evacuated. These areas may have suffered
damage, have debris issues, and utility outages (Zhang, Wolshon, Herrera, & Parr, 2019). These
parameters observed will help government agencies to be prepared. Numerous studies have
reportedly low compliance with official reentry plans: 38% for Hurricane Ike (Siebeneck,
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Lindell, Prater, Wu, & Huang) , 46.4% returning on or after scheduled return date for Hurricane
Rita (Siebeneck & Cova, An Assesment Return Entry Process for Hurricane Rita 2005.), and no
studies for wildfires reentry. Assuming that the reason there is a lack of studies done for reentries
during wildfire events is because of the great damage to property that this natural disaster causes.
Considering this relatively low compliance, it is important for researchers to investigate and
agencies to understand when evacuees will return and the volume in which they do so. The use
of this spatial-temporal analysis and literature will help the four phases of disaster management:
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. This study uses aggregate data to improve this
understanding.
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Chapter III
Methodology
Broadly, the research methodology utilized traffic count data taken from across the state
of Florida and California to investigate the auto-based evacuation response and reentry of
communities from both Hurricane Irma (2017), Michael (2018), Tubbs Fire (2017), and Thomas
Fire (2018). The first part of the methodology was to process traffic count data used in the
analysis. The second part of the methodology discussion demonstrates how this data was used
to estimate the start and end of the auto-based evacuation, the loading and peaking characteristics
of the auto-based evacuation, and the total number of vehicles used in the evacuation process, as
well as the effective start and end of the auto-based reentry.
Data Collection and Processing
The SunGuide program gathers roadway data from across the State of Florida. Traffic
counts are reported hourly and archived for analysis. There are 255 SunGuide locations; each
provides bidirectional hourly counts. For the analysis of the hurricane Irma evacuation, data was
collected, cataloged, and processed for a 36-day period beginning August 27th, 2017 and ending
October 1st, 2017. The analysis of Hurricane Michael encompasses the same locations and
included a 14-day period that began October 1st, 2018 and concluded October 14th, 2018.
The evacuation analysis focuses on five general regions of Florida: Naples, the Florida
Keys, Southeast Florida, and Tampa were analyzed during the Hurricane Irma evacuation and
sections of the Florida Panhandle were investigated for the hurricane Michael evacuation. Naples
and the Florida Keys were included in the analysis because hurricane Irma made landfall in both
regions. Southeast Florida was included in the analysis because this region of Florida is the most
heavily populated and was directly in the path of Hurricane Irma, as previously shown Figure 8.
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The Tampa region was also included in the analysis because it too is heavily populated and was
Irma’s path. Unlike Irma, Hurricane Michael showed a consistent and ultimately accurate storm
path projection, leading to the evacuation being focused in the panhandle region. For this reason,
only one analysis zone was investigated for Hurricane Michael.
The SunGuide data collection sites were selected to encompass each of the five regions,
similar to the way a cordon line identifies the inner and outer limits of a region. The SunGuide
locations and analysis regions were provided in Figure 8. Given the relative location of each
count station, directional counts were classified as “inbound”, into the region, or “outbound”,
out of the region. Drawing a cordon line around a major city, a net increase in the number of
inbound vehicles would be expected in the morning, while the opposite would be expected in
the afternoon, for a normal commute. As such, it should also be expected that the number of
vehicles entering the region in the morning should be approximately equal to the number exiting
in the evening. A failure to maintain this equilibrium would result in an overall net increase or
decrease of vehicles within the cordoned area. However, during an evacuation, this pattern is
broken resulting in the number of vehicles exits significantly outnumbering vehicle entries.
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Figure 8. SunGuide Data Collections and Analysis Regions.

Similarly, the Performance Measurement Systems (PEMs) Data Source is a Caltrans
(State of California) system that collects and organizes all of the detectors in an area where these
detectors are installed. The assumed limits chosen for the wildfire data analysis in this study are
near the areas where there was mandatory evacuations in a state road that had reliable data points.
Tubbs Fire data was collected, classified, and processed for a 36-day period beginning October
1st, 2017 and ending November 5th, 2017 northeast of Santa Rosa, CA. The analysis of Thomas
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Fire evacuation encompasses the west coast of Los Angeles locations and included a 26-day
period that began November 27th, 2018 and concluded December 22nd, 2018.
The evacuation analysis focuses on four counties of California: Napa, Somona, Ventura,
and Santa Barbara were analyzed during the Tubbs Fire and Thomas Fire evacuations. These
regions were included because of the locations of the fires and because these fires were the
biggest destructive fires in 2017 and 2018, as previously shown Figure 9 and 10. The PEMs data
collection sites were selected to encompass each of the four regions, similar to the way a cordon
line identifies the inner and outer limits of a region. The PEMs locations and analysis regions
were provided in Figure 9 and 10. Given the relative location of each count station, directional
counts were classified as “inbound”, into the region, or “outbound”, out of the region. Drawing
a cordon line around a major city, a net increase in the number of inbound vehicles would be
expected in the morning, while the opposite would be expected in the afternoon, for a normal
commute similar to the hurricane evacuations. Similarly to the hurricane “inbounds” and
“outbounds”, it should also be expected that the number of vehicles entering the region in the
morning should be approximately equal to the number exiting in the evening. A failure to
maintain this equilibrium would result in an overall net increase or decrease of vehicles within
the cordoned area. However, during an evacuation, this pattern is broken resulting in the number
of vehicles exits significantly outnumbering vehicle entries.
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Cordon Points
Figure 9. Tubbs Fire (2017) PEMs detector for data collection shown as a
yellow symbol.

Cordon Points
Figure 10. Thomas Fire (2018) PEMs detector for data collection shown as a yellow symbol.

37
Evacuation Analysis
Fundamentally, the change in the number of vehicles within a defined cordon boundary
can be measured by adding the number vehicles crossing a cordon line into the area and
subtracting the number of vehicles exiting. This simple method can determine the change in the
number of vehicles within the boundary area. By establishing a cordon line around an evacuating
city or region, it is possible to estimate the net change in vehicles, i.e., the number of evacuating
vehicles. Let the number of vehicles entering an evacuation area 𝐴 from location 𝑖 along the
cordon line for area 𝐴, over time interval 𝑡, be represented by 𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐴 . Likewise, let the number of
vehicles exiting 𝐴 at 𝑖, during 𝑡, be represented by the variable 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐴 . The start of the evacuation
is noted as 𝜏 and the recovery time, after the evacuation and reentry of 𝐴, as 𝑇. The net change
in vehicles can be calculated at any time 𝑡, as ∆𝑡𝐴 in Equation 1:
∆𝑡𝐴 = ∑𝐼𝑖=1(𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐴 −𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐴 )

(1)

In practice, roadway detectors along major routes capture the number of vehicles passing
in each direction (𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐴 −𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐴 ). A cordon line can be delineated by connecting detector
locations to encompass a city or region. In general, daily commuting patterns tend to result in
approximately the same number of vehicles entering and exiting a region during any 24-hour
𝐼
24
period 𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐴 = 0 = Σ𝑡=1
Σ𝑖=1
(𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐴 − 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐴 ). While seasonal variations or special circumstances

often occur that violate this assumption, the daily equilibrium tends to remain relatively in
balance. Determining the approximate time an evacuation begins (𝜏) and recovery ends (𝑇) has
been a significant challenge for emergency managers. However, as the traffic pattern changes
over time, the imbalance caused by the evacuation in favor of outbound vehicles becomes
24
evident i.e. Σ𝑡=1
∆𝑡𝐴 < 0. While it remains, difficult to estimate the precise time at which the
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evacuation begins and recovery ends, due to the stochastic nature of driving patterns and
behaviors, this research shows, to the hour, when the traffic pattern deviated from a typical
commuting regimen. Therefore, this research defines the start of the auto-based evacuation 𝜏 and
the recovery time (the end of the reentry) 𝑇 as the start and end times corresponding to a net loss
in vehicles that is inclusive of the hurricanes landfall time, 𝑡1 .
The total number of evacuating vehicles for area 𝐴 is calculated as the minimum value
of the cumulative ∆𝑡𝐴 . The clearance point of the auto-based evacuation (𝑡𝑐𝑝 ) is the time at which
the cumulative ∆𝑡𝐴 reaches its minimum value (i.e., when the most evacuees have exited the
cordoned area. For a hurricane evacuation, the clearance point typically occurs before or at
landfall (𝜏 < 𝑡𝑐𝑝 ≤ 𝑡𝑙 ). The clearance time (𝑡𝑐𝑡 ) is the duration between the start of the
evacuation and the clearance point (𝑡𝑐𝑡 = 𝑡𝑐𝑝 − 𝜏). The peak evacuation traffic is seen when ∆𝑡𝐴
reaches a minimum value. The peak evacuation hour 𝑡𝑝 , is the hour that sees ∆𝑡𝐴 reach a minimum
value. This minimum could then be considered the peak evacuation exit volume of the area.
Evacuation peak demand flow rate and evacuation peak hour factor can also be calculated, if the
detectors report 15-minut count intervals or shorter.
By considering the maximum value of the cumulative ∆𝑡𝐴 as 100 percent of the auto-base
evacuation demand, then 𝑡𝑐𝑡 represents the clearance time for 100 percent of the auto-based
evacuees. It is therefore possible to estimate the clearance time for any proportion of the autobased evacuation. For example, the clearance time corresponding to 90 percent of the auto-based
evacuation 𝑡𝑐𝑡90 is the time at which 90 percent of the cumulative ∆𝑡𝐴 minimum is achieved. In
this fashion, it is possible to estimate vehicle exit rates and id travel time data is available, these
exit rates could be adjusted to estimate vehicle-loading rates.
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Chapter IV
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The results focused on the development and analysis of figures that show ∆𝑡𝐴 and the
cumulative ∆𝑡𝐴 for the Florida and California communities affected by hurricanes Irma and
Michael as well as the wildfires. These figures were used to determine the total number of
evacuating vehicles, start of the auto-based evacuation (𝜏), and end of the recovery period (𝑇),
clearing point (𝑡𝑐𝑝 ), the peak evacuation volume (∆𝑡𝐴 minimum) and hour (𝑡𝑝 ). The results also
discussed the development of evacuation time estimate curves, which show the cumulative
percent evacuating each region over time. For these curves, it was possible to estimate the 90
percent clearance time 𝑡𝑐𝑡90 , 50 percent clearance time 𝑡𝑐𝑡50 , etc. Finally, the results show how
data collected from the evacuation of the Florida Keys was used to substantiate prior survey
results from the region.
Evacuation Figures for Florida Hurricanes
Figure 9 shows the evacuation and reentry traffic resulting from Hurricane Irma
evacuation of the Naples, FL region. The primary y-axis displays ∆𝑡𝐴 , the number of evacuated
vehicles hourly. The secondary y-axis displays the cumulative number of evacuating vehicles
for all time periods between the start of the evacuation (𝜏) and end of reentry (𝑇). The x-axis is
time, in hours. Landfall 𝑡𝑙 is shown with a thick vertical line for September 10th, 2017 at 15:00
when the storm made landfall on Marco Island, FL. The figure shows a typical example week
traffic pattern to demonstrate the disparity between the evacuation and routine conditions. In
general, the daily traffic shows a morning peak of traffic entering the region (𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐴 > 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐴 ) and
an afternoon peak where the vehicles are leaving the region (𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐴 > 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐴 ) . The evacuation
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traffic shows net losses in the number of vehicles prior to landfall and net increases, post landfall,
representing re-entry. The maximum traffic demand periods during both the evacuation and
reentry are shown on the figure as the peaks and valleys of the evacuation traffic line. The figure
shows these points of interest. It is important to note that the cordon line, which encircled the
Naples Region, did not constitute a true cordon, as data for many smaller roads were not
available. However, the cordon likely captures the vast majority of evacuees. Naples saw a net
decrease of 123,202 vehicles in the days leading up to the storm. The evacuation of Naples began
approximately 126 hours before the landfall and concluded 122 hours later (just for hours before
the eye wall of the storm crossed onto Marco Island). This was unexpected finding and suggests
the unpredictable path may have delayed the decision of whether and when to evacuate. The
peak evacuation demand occurred 28 hours before landfall at 11:00 and the reentry process took
169 hours (over seven days) to conclude.

Evacuation & Reentry: Naples
Evacuation Week
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Figure 11. Naples Evacuation and Reentry Traffic Analysis
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The figure for the Florida Keys is shown in Figure 10. unlike the other four regions, the
Florid Keys have only one primary evacuation route and therefore the analysis represents data
collected from only one detector location. The analysis found that 40,731 vehicles crossed the
cordon line, not to return until after the storm. The evacuation began approximately 120 hours
before landfall (on Cudjoe Key Sept. 10, 2017 at 9:00) and concluded 108 hours later. The peak
evacuation demand occurred 89 hours before landfall at 16:00. The reentry of the 40,731 vehicles
required 484 hours or 20 days and four hours after landfall. This was likely because many
residents of the lower keys were not permitted to return home for several days.
Figure 11 shows the evacuation figure for Southeast Florida. This cordon line included
nine detector locations along the major highways and freeways exiting a region. Again, it was
not possible to conduct a true cordon, as many lower capacity streets were not available for
analysis. Southeast Florida saw 276,052 vehicles leave the area in the days leading up to the
storm. The evacuation began 95 hours before landfall on Cudjoe Key and concluded 62 hours
later. The peak demand occurred 66 hours before landfall at 15:00. The analysis also found that
20,282 vehicles (7.35 percent) actually entered Southeast Florida, after it had cleared. That is to
say after the cumulative change in volume reached its minimum value before landfall, over
20,000 vehicles travelled into and stayed in Southeast Florida as an evacuation destination. This
was likely a combination of two reasons: 1) Southeast Florida has the largest, therefore many
people would have friends and family in the area, marking it a desirable destination after the
storm’s path had changed. 2) It was likely that some evacuees, after seeing the updated
projections returned home before the storm made landfall. The evacuation reentry took seven
days and 23 hours (191 hours) to complete.
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Evacuation & Reentry: Florida Keys
Evacuation Traffic
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Figure 12. Florida Keys Evacuation and Reentry Traffic Analysis.
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Figure 13. Southeast Florida Evacuation and Reentry Traffic Analysis.
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Figure 12 shows the evacuation plot for the Tampa Region of Florida. The Tampa area
cordon included nine detector locations. In the days leading up to the evacuation. Tampa
experienced a net increase in vehicles between Tuesday morning and the start of the evacuation
on the following Friday afternoon. The number of vehicles within the Tampa region increased
by 20,768 over this period. This may suggest Tampa was a desirable evacuation destination prior
to the storm’s path change or it could simply be residents returning from the Labor Day break
on September 4th, 2017. In either event, the Tampa area experienced a net loss of 135,080
vehicles by the time Hurricane Irma made landfall. The evacuation began approximately 47
hours before landfall and concluded 57 hours later (10 hours after the storm reached Cudjoe
Key). The peak evacuation demand occurred just 21 hours prior to landfall at 10:00 and the
reentry took just four days and four hours (100 hours) to complete.
Figure 13 shows the evacuation from Hurricane Michael in the Florida Panhandle
Region. Its cordon line consisted of seven detector locations on the major exit routes of the area.
Severe damage to the power grid resulted in the loss of service to many of the data collection
sites. Leading up to and after the storm’s landfall. Detector failure began at midnight of October
10,2018 and continued (on and off) until the data collection period ended. This shown in the
figure as a yellow overlay depicting times of poor data quality. Prior to the data collection failure,
16,370 vehicles were recorded during the evacuation 13 hours before landfall. At the time of
landfall, the remaining detectors indicated that 18,302 vehicles had exited. However, these
additional exits were recorded while nearly half of the seven detector locations were inoperable.
In reality, it is likely the evacuation encompassed more than 20,000 vehicles. Still, the autobased evacuation began 187 hours prior to landfall. Due to the detector error, it was not possible
to determine the exact time of the clearance point but based on the data available it may have
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occurred just two hours prior to landfall. No estimate for the evacuating vehicles could return.
The evacuation peaked 42 hours before landfall at 8:00.
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Evacuation and Reentry Time Estimates
Figure 7 shows the evacuation time estimates for the five study regions. The y-axis shows
the cumulative percent of vehicles exiting the cordoned area. The x-axis shows the number of
hours, which have elapsed since the start of the evacuation (𝑇 − 𝜏). From this figure, the
evacuation clearance time may be estimated for any cumulative percent evacuated. For example,
the time needed to evacuate 50 percent of the residents of the Florida Keys was 34 hours. Likewise,
99 percent of evacuees in the Naples Region were able to clear the area within 104 hours, as
compared to the last one percent, which required an additional 18 hour. The figure also presents a
comparison of the exiting rate and by extension the loading rate for each region. The figure
suggests that Southeast Florida and the Tampa region mobilized quickly as compared to the Florida
Keys and Naples Region. However, regions showing slower mobilization began comparatively
earlier than those with longer loading rates did. The mobilization in response to Hurricane Michael,
on the other hand spanned several days before spiking two days prior to landfall. This was likely
because the projected storm path did not deviate much in days leading up to landfall. This could
have allowed residents in coastal areas to evacuate earlier. However, as the storm approached, it
rapidly intensified. These later forecasts were likely the cause of large evacuation response closer
to landfall and the resulting spike in network loading. With the exception of the Florida Keys, the
evacuation reentry generally tended to be more gradual than the evacuation itself. The Florida
Keys experienced severe damage resulting from the storm which led to curfews, travel restrictions,
and ultimately the prolonged reentry curve shown in the figure. Half of the population of Southeast
Florida that evacuated by vehicle did so within 23 hours after the evacuation began. However, it
was not for another 120 hours that half of the population reentered. Therefore, the average evacuee
from Southeast Florida was displaced for up to five days. Using this same approach, 50 percent of
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the Naples auto-based evacuees were displaced for 120 hours as well. The displacement time for
the 50th percentile of the auto-based evacuees from the Tampa Region was only 64 hours whereas
the average Florida Keys resident was displaced for 278 hours, over 11.5 days.
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Figure 16. Evacuation Time Estimates
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Summary Results
Table 1 provides summary data, pulled from each region’s evacuation figure as well as
the evacuation time estimate analysis. The table shows that Southeast Florida experienced the
largest net loss in vehicles. This was expected as this region has the highest population and was
likely to see the greatest number of evacuees. In general, the evacuations began several days
before the storm made landfall. However, Tampa did not begin to evacuate substantially until 47
hours before landfall. It is likely that the Tampa evacuees did not make their decisions to
evacuate until much later because the storm was originally predicted to hit the Southeast Florida
and only have a marginal impact in the Tampa area. The evacuation from Hurricane Michael
shows evacuees leaving the region over one week in advance of the storm. The Florida Keys,
Southeast Florida and the Panhandle saw the peak evacuation hour, two to three days in advance
of the landfall. This is a significant finding because it suggests that hurricane warnings and
evacuation notification were taken seriously and acted upon. However, Naples and Tampa did
not experience peak demand until 28 and 21 hours before the storm arrived, respectively. Again,
this was likely because of the shifting storm track. Tampa experienced the fastest reentry time
of just four days and four hours after landfall. Naples and Southeast Florida had similar recovery
times of just over a week. The Florida Keys required more than 20 days for the traffic patterns
to recover. This was likely because the keys were the hardest hit and access was restricted to the
lower keys for nearly three weeks. The clearance time was provided for when 50 percent, 90
percent, 99 percent, and 100 percent of evacuees exited the region. The table shows Naples and
the Florida Keys has the longest clearance times from Hurricane Irma. It is not likely coincidental
that these two regions were also the hardest hit by the storm. The clearance time for Hurricane
Michael was estimated to be significantly longer than any region impacted by Irma. The
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extended clearance time may suggest that while some evacuees decided to leave early, others
departed only once the storm had intensified. This likely resulted in a two-phase evacuation, one
for those who evacuated as a result of the first storm projection and one for those who decided
to evacuate after the second. Southeast Florida and Tampa had significantly shorter clearance
times despite evacuating more vehicles. This was likely because these areas have more, higher
capacity roads and freeways and their evacuations started much later when compared to the other
regions.
Table 1. Summary of Hurricane Evacuation Analysis
All Times Shown Relative to Landfall
Peak
Evac.
Clearance time (𝒕𝒄𝒕 )
Hours
Reentry
50%
90% 99% 100%
(𝒕𝒑 )
(𝑻)

Total Veh

Evac.
Initiated
(𝝉)

FL Keys

40,731

5d, 0hr

3d, 17hr

20d, 4hr

34

73

92

104

S.E. FL

276,052

2d, 23hr

2d, 18hr

7d, 1hr

23

42

48

53

Naples Region

123,202

5d, 6hr

1d 4hr

7d, 1hr

68

97

104

122

Tampa Region

130,407

1d, 23hr

0d, 21hr

4d, 4hr

17

30

41

47

FL Panhandle
(Michael)

16,370

7d, 19hr

1d, 18hr

N/A*

156

166

173

185*

Regions

*exact value not able to be determine.

Comparison with Survey Results
In response to the active hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005, the Florida State
Legislators authorized the development of regional evacuation studies. Contracting with
Florida’s Regional Planning Councils, the Statewide Regional Evacuation Study Program
(SRESP) was developed to support and update local government emergency management plans.
As part of the SRESP, a series of stated choice surveys were conducted to better understand
evacuation modeling and shelter planning. The behavior assumptions collected as part of that
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survey were: evacuation rate, out-of-county trips, type of refuge, percent of available vehicles,
and evacuation timing. Surveys were conducted with 400 residents in each of the Florida’s 67
counties.
To demonstrate further the application of the proposed methodology, the results of the
SRESP surveys were analyzed to estimate the auto-based evacuation response of a Category 4
hurricane landfall in the lower keys. These results were then compared to the values generated
by Hurricane Irma (a Category 4 hurricane that made landfall on Cudjoe Key). The analysis first
investigated the number of evacuating vehicles predicted by the SRESP while the second
assessed the evacuation timing curve results. The 2017 Census data were used to calculate the
number of site-built and mobile homes of the Florida Keys region. Then the SRESP survey
results were used to estimate the evacuation participation rate, percent of the vehicles used, and
the number of available vehicles. Through this process, the number of evacuating vehicles could
be estimated for a hypothetical storm. Further, the SRESP forecast three evacuation timing
scenarios (fast response, normal response, and slow response). These scenarios represent a 24hour mobilization time for evacuees. However, based on the results already discussed, the
evacuation of the Florida Keys took several days.
Table 2 shows the estimated number of vehicles evacuating the Florida Keys because of
a Category 4 hurricane landfall in the lower keys. To remain consistent with Hurricane Irma,
these results assume a Category 4 scenario for Key West and the Lower Keys, a Category 3
storm in the middle keys, and a Category 2 storm in the Upper Keys. The analysis suggests up
to approximately 53,781 vehicles may be used during the evacuation. The analysis of the
Hurricane Irma results found 40,731 vehicles. A number of factors likely contributed to the more
than 10,000 vehicle disparity between the predicted value and the observed. The most significant
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of which was the SRESP study stating, “the planning assumptions for the evacuation rates are
the maximum probable rates” (Baker, 2010). Therefore, the evacuation values estimated by the
SRESP survey represent the upper limit of evacuees from any storm likely to affect the region.
In this sense, the SRESP was accurate in that planning values were not surpassed by the Irma
evacuation and were reasonably accurate. In addition, the SRESP results were based om surveys
conducted in 2007 and 2008, nearly ten years before hurricane Irma. Updated survey results
might lead to more accurate predictions.

Table 2. SRESP Estimate of the Number of Vehicles Evacuating the Florida Keys

Keys
Region

Households ¹

Evac. Rate ²

Vehicles Use Rate ² Vehicles.
Error! Reference source
Avail.³
not found.

Built

Mobile

Built

Mobile

Built

Mobile

Upper

15,789

1,886

50%

75%

75%

80%

Middle

6,929

1,338

70%

85%

75%

Lower

7,459

1,373

80%

95%

West

15,714

2,859

80%

95%

Evac. Vehicles
Built

Mobile

1.8

10,658

2,037

80%

1.8

6,548

1,638

75%

80%

2.6

11,637

2,714

80%

85%

1.5

15,086

3,463

Total Vehicles = 53,781
¹ U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Monroe County, Florida. (2018). Retrieved from
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/monroecountyflorida

² Baker, E. (2010). Statewide Regional Evacuation Study Program: Volume 2-11 South Florida Region Regional Behavioral
Analysis. Retrieved from United States, Florida Division of Emergency management, South Florida Regional Planning
Council: http://www.sfrpc.com/SRESP Web/Vol2-11.pdf

³ Downs, P., Prusaitis, S., Germain, J., & Baker, J. (2010). Statewide Regional Evacuation Program: Volume 3-11 South
Florida Region Regional Behavioral Survey Report. Retrieved from United States, Florida Division of Emergency
Management, South Florida Regional Planning Council: https://www.sffrpc.com/SRESP Web/Vol3-11.pdf

Figure 8 shows the three evacuation planning curves developed as part of the SRESP and
the cumulative percent of vehicles evacuating the Florida Keys during Hurricane Irma. The xaxis displays the number of hours relative to government issued, mandatory evacuation orders.
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The three planning curves represent a slow, normal, and fast evacuation response scenario.
However, each was complete within a 24-hour period. This was done within the SRESP to
estimate a severe shift in storm forecast that prompts a shortened window of evacuation. Again,
representing the more severe conditions which are still probable to occur. In addition, the curve
resulting from Hurricane Irma was based on the number of vehicles exiting the region, not the
number of vehicles loading on the road network. Therefore, the planning curves do not account
for travel time between residents’ homes and the detector location. The figure shows that over
20 percent of the residents evacuating the Keys did so before mandatory evacuation orders were
in place. However, the response curves predicted from the SRESP survey show this value to be
10 percent. In general, the SRESP survey estimated the most severe evacuation projections in
term s of the number of evacuees and loading, that could reasonably expected to occur.
Therefore, the values estimated by the SRESP were likely reasonable. It was not unreasonable
to assume that if Irma’s intensity projection were fixed in the days leading up to landfall, that an
additional 20,000 vehicles may have been used during the evacuation.

Evacuation Timing Curves for Planning: Estimated vs Observed
Irma Evacuation of the FL Keys
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Figure 17. Evacuation Timing Curves for the Florida Keys
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Evacuation Figures for California Wildfires
Figure 20 shows the evacuation and reentry traffic resulting from Tubbs Fire evacuation
of the Napa and Somona County, CA region. The primary y-axis displays ∆𝑡𝐴 , the number of
evacuated vehicles hourly. The secondary y-axis displays the cumulative number of evacuating
vehicles for all time periods between the start of the evacuation (𝜏) and end of reentry (𝑇). The
x-axis is time, in hours. Landfall 𝑡𝑙 is shown with a thick vertical line for October 8th, 2017 at
19:00 when the fire broke out between Kellogg and Calistoga, CA. The figure shows a typical
example week traffic pattern to demonstrate the disparity between the evacuation and routine
conditions. In general, the daily traffic shows a morning peak of traffic entering the region
(𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐴 > 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐴 ) and an afternoon peak where the vehicles are leaving the region (𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡𝐴 > 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡𝐴 ).
The evacuation traffic shows net losses in the number of vehicles prior to the start of the fire and
net increases, post fire, representing re-entry. The maximum traffic demand periods during both
the evacuation and reentry are shown on the figure as the peaks and valleys of the evacuation
traffic line. The figure shows these points of interest. It is important to note that chosen detectors,
which are located near the evacuation zones, did not constitute the only access to the evacuation,
as data for many smaller roads were not available. However, the chosen detectors likely capture
the vast majority of evacuees. Part of Somona and Napa counties saw a net decrease of 43,000
vehicles in the days after the fire started. The evacuation began approximately 48 hours after the
fire started and the evacuation did not conclude since there was not enough information to
evaluate the reentry. The peak evacuation demand occurred 10 hours after the fire broke out.
This was unexpected finding and suggests that since the location were the fire start is in a
vegetated area the closest residential area is southwest with about 6.38 miles away from the
origin of the fire. The reentry start was not able to be evaluated through the traffic analysis since
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residents are not going to return to burnt properties where everything is considered to be lost.
Figure 18 shows the nearby fires that caused an increase in traffic prior to the start of the fire.

Figure 18. Fires nearby the Tubbs Fire that occurred either prior or subsequently after Tubbs Fire.
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Egress: Tubbs Fire 2018
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Figure 19. Napa and Somona County Evacuation and Reentry Traffic Analysis for Tubbs Fire (2017)

Egress: Thomas Fire 2018
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Figure 20. Santa Barbara and Ventura County Evacuation and Reentry Traffic Analysis for Thomas Fire (2018)
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Figure 21 shows the evacuation and reentry traffic resulting from Thomas Fire (2018)
evacuation of the Ventura and Santa Barbara County, CA region. The primary y-axis (∆𝑡𝐴 ),
secondary y-axis (evacuation beginning: 𝜏; end of reentry: 𝑇), x-axis (t – hours), fire start (𝑡𝑙 )
for December 4th, 2018 when the fire broke out west of Steckle Park in the area of Los Angeles,
CA. The figure shows a typical example week traffic pattern to demonstrate the disparity
between the evacuation and routine conditions. The evacuation traffic shows net losses in the
number of vehicles prior to the start of the fire and net increases, post fire, representing re-entry.
The maximum traffic demand periods during both the evacuation and reentry are shown on the
figure as the peaks and valleys of the evacuation traffic line. The figure shows these points of
interest. It is important to note that chosen detectors, which are located near the evacuation zones,
did not constitute the only access to the evacuation, as data for many smaller roads were not
available. However, the chosen detectors likely capture the vast majority of evacuees.
Part of Ventura and Santa Barbara counties saw a net decrease of 120,000 vehicles in the
days after the fire started. The evacuation began approximately 2 days and 3 hours after the fire
started and the evacuation did not conclude since there was not enough information to evaluate
the reentry. This was unexpected finding and suggests that since the location were the fire start
is in a vegetated area the closest residential area is Santa Paula with about 5 miles away from the
origin of the fire. Figure 19 shows the nearby fires that caused an increase in traffic prior to the
start of the fire. The peak evacuation demand occurred 3 days after the fire broke out and the
reentry process was not able to be determine since the graphs do not show vehicles volumes.
The reentry start was not able to be evaluated through the traffic analysis since residents are not
going to return to burnt properties where everything is considered to be lost. Figure 19 shows
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the nearby fires that caused an increase in traffic prior to the start of the fire. According to
Shatkin, more than 4,000 firefighters were needed to extinguish the Thomas Fire (Shatkin, 2017).
Table 2 provides summary data of the traffic analysis illustrated in Figures 21.

Table 3. Summary of Wildfire Evacuation Analysis
All Times Shown Relative to Fire Start
Regions
Peak Hours (𝒕𝒑 )
Evac. Initiated (𝝉)
Evac. Reentry (𝑻)
1d, 23hr
2d, 3hr

Tubbs Fire (2017)
Thomas Fire (2018)

0d, 10hr
3d, 0hr

N/A*
N/A*

*exact value not able to be determined
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Figure 21. Cumulative Percentage of Auto-Based trips comparing Tubbs and Thomas Fires in the state of
California
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Figure 21 shows the cumulative percent of evacuated vehicles since the start of the
evacuation. Since the analysis does not include a true cordon line, but a screen line point, the
cumulative amounts of vehicles evacuating are not accurate. However, the actual time shown in
the following graph is accurate for time it took the vehicles to exit the area. The graph does not
show the reentry event because the reentry data was not available for analysis since the data is
not reliable. Tubbs Fire evacuation order and real evacuation event was effective, Figure 21
shows that the 30 percent of the vehicles started evacuating within 10 hours. On the other hand,
Thomas Fire evacuation about 30 percent of the vehicles evacuated within 73 hours of the start
of the evacuation, vehicles took longer to evacuate compared to Tubbs Fire.

Figure 22. Fires nearby the Thomas Fire that occurred either prior or subsequently after Thomas Fire.
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Chapter V
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Often, the perceived success of an evacuation, or lack thereof, is based on media reports,
anecdotal observation or, worse, rumors and social media discussion. In reality, a highly
effective evacuation could be assumed a failure because of a few limited but highly visible areas
of congestion. This has suggested the need for a better way to describe and assess large statewide
evacuations in more systematic and objective ways. Unfortunately, this is not easy to accomplish
because there are few, if any, data records or performance measures generated that accurately
and effectively describe the conditions of these events. In fact, there is no standardized
methodology to quantify the characteristics of an evacuation that is transferable and repeatable
between state departments of transportation.
Fortunately, there are many commonly used data measures for analyzing routine
transportation conditions. The intent of this work was to adapt and apply them to develop a
method capable of describing mass evacuations. In fact, these methods can also be applied to
describe evacuation reentry traffic patterns; a historically lightly studied area in practice and
research. The results of this effort showed these methods could be quite effective to illustrate
statewide temporal and spatial trends of traffic movement as well as infer evacuee behavioral
responses and threat interpretation.
Results of the application of the research methodology showed that the evacuations from
Hurricane Irma and Michael began several days before landfall. They further suggest that
Michael evacuees, presumably in low-lying coastal regions prone to flooding, began evacuating
as much as seven days before landfall. Similarly, vulnerable residents in Florida Keys started
their evacuations five days before Hurricane Irma’s landfall with nearly 20 percent departing
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prior to the mandatory evacuation order. This observation was unexpected because prior survey
results suggested that a two-day loading was most likely (Baker, 2010). In general, the
evacuations peaked two to three days before landfall and between the hours of 8:00 AM and
3:00 PM confirming prior research that suggested a preference for morning departures (Lindell,
Murray-Tuite, Wolshon, & Baker, 2019). In addition, the largest reentry time relative to landfall
for these 5 regions was 20 days, it can be concluded that since the region was the Florida Keys
is a vulnerable region in the state of Florida than most regions because of the infrastructures and
possible flooding and destruction took longer for the residents to travel back to their origin. From
an emergency preparedness standpoint, these trends are positive and suggest an increased civic
awareness of hazard risk perception.
The research also found that half of the auto-based evacuees from Southeast Florida and
the Naples region were displaced for up to five days. The 50th percentile displacement time for
Florida Keys residents, which evacuated by car saw significantly longer displacement times of
over 11 days. When comparing stated choice survey results taken from Florida Keys’ residents,
the predicted participation rates suggested an upper bound of evacuating vehicles that was
reasonably accurate to the Hurricane Irma evacuation; given the uncertain path and intensity of
the storm.
The wildfire application with the research methodology showed that the evacuations
from Thomas Fire and Tubbs Fire began shortly after the mandatory evacuation announcement
was published. With the dry environment that the state of California has the fire spreads quickly
and for safety evacuees need to make a quicker decision than those evacuees in the state of
Florida. Tubbs Fire had about 43,000 vehicles that evacuated between October 17th and October
18th, while there was about 90% of the fire being contained. Tubbs fire mandatory evacuation
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announcement were given a day after the fire broke out and people did not evacuate until about
23 hours following the orders, on the emergency preparedness perception, the residents were
proactive and quickly on the evacuation orders given when dealing with a rapidly fire spread.
Thomas Fire mandatory evacuation announcement for Ventura County was announced
December 4th in the evening and about 87,000 residents evacuated between Tuesday and
Thursday. On the other hand, while the fire started spreading to Santa Barbara County, their
government officials announced to start evacuating the area on December 21st at 9:00 PM and
about 95,000 residents evacuated shortly after (Guerin, 2017). Thomas Fire’s mandatory
evacuation was given within 24 hours following the fire start and immediately after, the residents
evacuated within 10 hours of the evacuation orders.
These two phenomena have several differences in terms of intensity, paths, resident’s
preparedness, and traffic pattern. Hurricane Irma and Michael had very different paths which
affected their evacuation patterns before and during the time evacuation occurrence. These paths
changed the trajectory of the evacuees on their destination, similarly to the traffic pattern of
evacuees, the fires surrounding the area affected the traffic pattern of the evacuees in the state of
California for both wildfires. The intensity of both hurricanes were unique which affected the
times the evacuees decided to evacuate, however the wildfires had no sign of any affected times
before the evacuation started. By comparison, the evacuation orders were communicated
differently in both cases. The hurricane mandatory evacuations were given about 3-5 days in
advance, which made many residents decide their destination depending on the predicted path
of the storm and evacuated between 5-7 days prior to landfall. Wildfires’ mandatory evacuations
were given within a day after the fire and minimal containment started, which is the analysis
shows that as soon as the orders were given residents evacuated immediately. In addition, the
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categorized start of the evacuation on both fires were within 24 hours of the evacuation orders.
Since the results did not show effects of the pre evacuation events for the wildfires but showed
that as soon as the announcements were communicated, the assumption is that evacuees waited
for the evacuation orders. On the other hand, the hurricane analysis did show that residents
evacuated ahead of time, which was categorized as the pre evacuation traffic. In addition, the
quick response of the wildfire cases compared to the hurricane cases is related to the intensity,
region, access, and spread of the both phenomenon.
Reentry could not be predicted or categorized in any of the Hurricane Michael and
California wildfire analysis or data because of limited access as well as inconsistent acquired
data for detectors. There are some assumptions that can made for the wildfire evacuations since
there were a couple of fires that took place around the studied regions. The analysis shows that
there was an in-flow number of vehicles during the reentry but were not totaling to the
commutative numbers of vehicles that were presented before the fire broke out. On the other
hand, Hurricane Michael’s reentry analysis and data set showed that the acquired information
was not reliable since the detectors that were considered were working correctly before and some
time during the storm.
Recommendations
This research provides a system for state departments of transportation and emergency
management officials to analyze future auto-based evacuations. The method also facilitates
parametric comparisons between evacuation events, an area needed to continue to evolve and
improve evacuation practice. Standardize measures for hurricane evacuations are needed to
facilitate systematic evaluations of performance. Future researchers could build upon methods
presented here to develop a level-of-service (LOS) analysis for emergency evacuations. This
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would be similar to the way the highway Capacity Manual uses the standardized collection and
processing of freeway densities for its LOS evaluations. With additional research, the methods
laid out in this paper could also lead to a more comprehensive understanding of evacuation traffic
processes and behavioral responses to improve their planning and management.
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Appendix A
Hurricane Irma (2017) and Hurricane Michael (2018)
Graphical Illustrations per Detectors
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Examples of the micro analysis on the Irma evacuation by sites, congested, not congested, with
either high or low volumes:

A high volume not congested during evacuation:

A high volume congested during evacuation:

74
A low volume not congested during evacuation:

A low volume congested during evacuation:
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A high volume not congested during re-entry:

A high volume congested during re-entry:
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A low volume not congested during re-entry:

A low volume congested during re-entry:
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Appendix
Tubs Fire (2017) and Thomas Fire (2018)
Graphical Illustrations per Detectors
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Outbound Regional Traffic: Tubbs Fire 2017
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Egress: Tubbs Fire 2017

3,000

Example Week
7000

2,000

5000

3000

1000

-1000

-3000

-2,000

-5000

-3,000

-7000

Cumlative Egress: Tubbs Fire 2017

10,000

Evacuation Week

0

-10,000

-20,000

-30,000

-40,000

-50,000

Dec. 19
Dec. 20
Dec. 21
Dec. 22

Dec. 20
Dec. 21
Dec. 22

Dec. 17

Dec. 16

Dec. 19

Example Week

Dec. 18

16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0

Dec. 18

Dec. 17

Dec. 16

Outbound Regional Traffic: Thomas Fire 2018
Evacuation Week

Dec. 15

Dec. 14

Dec. 13

Dec. 12

Dec. 11

Dec. 10

Evacuation Week

Dec. 15

Dec. 14

Dec. 13

Dec. 12

Dec. 11

Dec. 10

Dec. 9

Dec. 8

Dec. 7

Dec. 6

Dec. 5

Dec. 4

Dec. 3

Dec. 2

Dec. 1

Nov. 30

Nov. 29

Nov. 28

Nov. 27

Vehicles (hourly Counts)

Fire Broke Out

Dec. 9

Fire Broke Out

Dec. 8

Dec. 7

Dec. 6

Dec. 5

Dec. 4

Dec. 3

Dec. 2

Dec. 1

Nov. 30

Nov. 29

Nov. 28

Nov. 27

Vehicles (hourly Counts)

80

Inbound Regional Traffic: Thomas Fire 2018
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Appendix C
Maps and Figures
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